Trade has strong impacts on green house gas (GHG) emission and climate change. the trade between China and the European Union is critical to the global GHG reduction. The EU is committed to reduce its CO 2 emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. However, if the EU reaches its emissions targets by importing CO 2 -intensive products from China or other developing countries, the goals will be pointless. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The past ten years have been marked by an unprecedented expansion of China-EU trade. The China-EU trade in goods reached EUR 326 billion in 2008, which was 4.5 times bigger than in 1999, making the China-EU trade relationship one of the most important ones in the world. In 2008, China-EU trade deficit of commodities reached EUR 169.2 billion. Such imbalance in trade has triggered several trade disputes, however relatively little attention has been paid to its environmental impacts.
International trade has strong impacts on environment. Trade results in a geographic separation of consumers and pollution of consuming goods, which creates a mechanism for consumers to shift environmental pollution associated with their consumption to other countries. This could militate against current efforts in addressing the problems of climate change by merely shifting, for example, emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to other countries. The Kyoto Protocol set legally binding commitments for the industrialized countries to reduce overall emissions of six GHGs by 5.2% below the 1990 level during the years 2008-2012. The EU has ratified the Kyoto Protocol and committed to reduce its GHGemission by at least 20% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. However, if the EU reaches its emissions targets by importing CO 2 -intensive products from China or other developing countries, achieving the goals will be less meaningful in global terms.
In this study we analyze the impact of China-EU trade on climate change focusing on CO 2 emissions embodied in international trade. "Carbon leakage" in China-EU trade could be a noteworthy showcase, given the carbon-intensive industries in China and the growing volume of trade between China and the EU, adding to the future disputes between the two parties for years to come. Besides, CO 2 is by far the largest GHG by volume, representing about 71.4% of the total emissions of the six gases (WRI, 2010).
Due to the fast expanding foreign trade and the deteriorating environment, China attracted many studies in recent years and many of these found a positive correlation between trade and CO 2 emission. Shui Kornerup et al. (2008) found that global CO 2 emissions caused by total consumption in EU were 12% higher than the total CO 2 emissions that occurred within the EU in 2001.
However, none of these studies has examined the China-EU trade and CO 2 emissions, although this situation has started to change with the growing awareness of the problems posed by climate change. Using Input-Output approach, this paper not only estimates the quantity of CO 2 embodied in China-EU trade but also decomposes the emission changes into three effects: the scale effect, technology effect and composition effect. Moreover, the paper identifies the sectors contributing most to these embodied CO 2 emissions.
II. METHODOLOGY: THE INPUT-OUTPUT FRAMEWORK
AND STRUCTURAL DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS The input-output analysis (IOA) was firstly applied to describe economic-environmental relationships in 1972 by Leontief. It has been widely used in assessment of the impact of trade on global CO 2 emissions recently. Using input-output analysis (IOA), the total output of an economy is given by:
（1）
Where X is the vector of output, I is the identity matrix, which is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements one and others zero. A is a matrix of direct requirements, and
is Leontief inverse, which represents total requirements matrix (direct plus indirect). Y is the vector of final demand. Appropriate extensions of the input-output system allow us to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of economic policies on other economic variables such as labor, capital, energy and emissions. Most of these policy issues have to be analyzed with macroeconomic models which provide a minimum of sectoral disaggregation. So, CO 2 emissions embodied in international trade can be assessed by multiplying the CO 2 emissions factor using foreign trade figures (export and import vectors).
If E is direct CO 2 emission factors, the total emissions F generated by the final demand Y are given by
(2) Then, the CO 2 emission embodied in exports can be acquired by multiplying the CO 2 emissions factor by export and vector
However, a portion of China's and EU's exports are imported from other countries before reprocessed for export. So we should distinguish between domestically produced and imported products. A can be broken into two components representing the inter-industry requirements of domestically produced products and the inter-industry requirements of imported products, , where M is import coefficient, which is the share of imports in the supply of products to each sector. So, the emissions embodied in exports can be shown to be equal to:
To know the major source contributing to increasing CO 2 emissions, we can decompose the trade-induced CO 2 emissions into the scale, composition and technology effects. To do this, we further decompose
, where (5) can be summarized as follows:
A structural decomposition of the change of CO 2 emissions embodied in trade between two periods (0) and (1) can be derived as follows：
When using the structural decomposition analysis（SDA ）it is possible to compare terms relative to the start or end of each time-period, and this leads to a non-uniqueness problem (Dietzenbacher, 1998). A common solution to this problem is to use the average of the so-called two polar decomposition forms.
If it is decomposed from period (0), Eq. (7) 
If it is decomposed from period (1), Eq. (7) 
Then, the total changes of CO 2 emissions embodied in trade F Δ can be calculated as the average of Eq. (8) and Eq. 
Eq. (10) can be written simply as below:
(11) The first and second terms are "the technology effect". The third term is "the composition effect", which represents changes in the trade structure. The fourth term is "the scale effect", which represents the change in emissions resulting from a changed trade volume.
III. DATA SOURCE AND ADJUSTMENT
Most of the data we use in the study are from the international harmonized database estimated by OECD. The sector classification of OECD Input-output table, bilateral trade database and the IEA CO 2 emissions from fuel combustion are basically formatted and harmonized following the sector classification of "International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities" (ISIC Revision 3). Due to the limitations of detailed emission factors by sector, the 15 aggregated sectors are used in this study. And the empirical analysis of EU is limited to EU-15 due to their importance in EU and a lack of data.
IV. RESULTS
The CO 2 Figure.1 ). It is essential to examine the cause of the emission imbalance. Since EU-15 cannot be decomposed by countries and the emissions embodied in EU's exports are much less than China's, using SDA, we can only decompose the changes of emissions embodied in China's exports to the EU. Figure 2 shows a decomposition of these CO 2 emissions from 1995 to 2006 into the three effects. During the 11 years from 1995 to 2006, the CO 2 emissions embodied in China's exports to EU increased by 460%. The SDA shows that the scale effect drove the increase, while the technology effect and the composition effect offset some of the increases. If China's technology and economic structure had remained constant, scale effect would have caused the CO 2 emissions embodied in China's export to EU to increase by 584 Mt between 1995 and 2006. The technology effect led to a 144 Mt decrease (-151%). The composition effect led to a 2.48 Mt decrease (-2.6%). The technology effect was the main cause of the positive effects, which could be certified from the improvement of embodied CO 2 emissions factors.
It is useful to break down the emissions embodied in China's exports to EU by sectors to further analyze the composition effect. Figure 3 shows a breakdown of the growth in the emissions by sectors. In 2006, "Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment" generated 239 Mt CO 2 emissions, accounting for approximately 44.59% of the emissions embodied in China's exports to EU. Other main sectors that contributed most to the embodied emissions were "Basic metals and other non-metallic mineral products" (13.41%), "Rubber, plastics products and other manufacturing" (13.27%) and "Chemicals and chemical products" (11.78%). The different composition of the major sectors of export emissions in 1995 shows this clearly: namely, "Chemicals and chemical products" (28.36%), "Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment" (23.45%), "Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear" (14.51%) and "Rubber, plastics products and other manufacturing" (13.2%). Our analysis shows clearly that there is a dangerous and ever increasing CO 2 -trade deficit EU-China which is considerably higher than the parallel trade deficit. A better trade balance between EU and China in the sense that EU increases exports would contribute only a very small, almost insignificant amount to a reduction in the CO 2 trade balance. However, the increase in CO 2 -intensive exports to EU has contributed heavily to the EU-China trade deficit. In particular, the dynamics of the CO 2 trade imbalance is even more alarming than the increasing trade imbalance. Therefore, the first policy conclusion is that a new carbon footprint accounting system between China and the EU should be implemented. Furthermore, other countries should be included. Although there are still different views and practical issues on how to implement such a continuous accounting system, we believe this is the right direction toward a global policy prescription to stabilize the green house gas emissions.
By importing more and more from China, EU has increasingly outsourced emissions. The EU has generated an increasing ecological footprint in China, with respect to CO 2 . Taking account of this sheds a new light on EU-27's turnaround in CO 2 "made in EU" which reached a peak in 2005 and fell since then. If the China footprint were added, let alone other footprints in other trading partner countries, the EU CO 2 balance looks much less green, and China's balance looks a little bit less dirty. EU-caused emissions would not only be 13% higher (including the China footprint), but the dynamics are increasing. But is it legitimate and reasonable to look at CO 2 emissions in this way in a globalized economy? The issue is not to fuel a blame-game but to apportion responsibility and accountability for global CO 2 reduction.
The basic underlying question is whether the footprint can be accounted for by the final consumer country. This implies a consumer-oriented view, allocating responsibility for CO 2 reductions to the consumer nation, rather than using the traditional producer-oriented view which is behind the wellknown polluter-pays-principle in environmental economics. In a closed economy, both views are identical as all what is produced is also consumed, wherever the consumption takes place.
At a first glance, the producer-oriented view seems to be the superior view. Those who physically generate emissions, cause damages, harm others and should be responsible for causing negative external effects. The latter have to be internalized in cost calculations of the producers, and the consumers will have to bear these additional costs. But internalization policies are weak, at least weaker in developing countries such as China compared to EU, so that this textbook wisdom does not apply in reality without problems. If there are vast regulatory differentials between developed and developing countries which cannot be eliminated in the medium term, regulatory arbitrage occurs -mass scale outsourcing of CO 2 intensive production from OECD countries to others such as China. On the other hand, China enjoys the production, trade, employment and income effects of producing and exporting CO 2 -heavy products. China is exposed to moral hazard since the greenhouse effect risks are distributed to the global community; EU as well exploits moral hazard by bypassing domestic regulations through outsourcing of environmentally unfriendly production.
Following the consumer-oriented view implies that CO 2 reduction commitments should refer to those emissions caused by in the production of goods that are consumed or invested in the country, be they imported or domestically produced. The major disadvantages of the consumer-based view is that the consumer country has problems to reduce emissions related to imports apart from measures which are suspected to be protectionist; furthermore, responsibility for emissions related to exports is dismissed. Export-oriented countries would have incentives to lower standards for exports.
The consumer view enlarges the responsibility for CO 2 reductions for the EU, but still requires an enormous, though by around 8% reduced responsibility of China. EU could either cut more CO 2 emissions "at home" or import less CO 2 -intensive goods from China. Since marginal CO 2 -reduction costs are on average much more costly in Europe than in China, this view creates incentives for non cost-effective CO 2 reductions in Europe as long as there is no effective system of coherent international regulation.
Obviously neither the producer view nor the consumer view is conducive unless modes are taken into consideration how to cope with the problem of differential regulation standards. Assuming a system of global tradable CO 2 -emission certificates seems at first glance most suitable to generate a uniform global regulation. But how to allocate the initial endowments of emission certificates, and can all countries, at least all emerging economies be included? If we rule out this first-best system for reasons of political realism, only national climate change policies remain.
We see, in principle, three options with respect to the China-EU trade beyond the business-as-usual trend:
-China appreciates its currency vis à vis the Euro, embarks on a strategy to focus more on domestic demand rather than on excessive export(-surplus) led development and follows a much more ambitious policy of increasing CO 2 efficiency of its production so that the CO 2 content of the exports falls considerably, and the technology and composition effect gain more impact. Even without any specific trade regulations between the EU and China the CO 2 imbalance might be somewhat mitigated, but the basic problem of regulatory differentials and false incentives is likely to remain, at least for a long period.
-EU could impose import tariffs on Chinese CO 2 -intensive imports, or better on all such imports, perhaps at an increasing rate (starting from a low level) in order tax outsourced CO2-emissions Gros/Egenhofer (2010) argue that such carbon taxes can be made compatible with WTO law and are technically feasible. In the absence of a global emission trading system this could be a second-best option. Priewe (1998) argued already earlier that national or EU-wide energy taxes can be supported by a taxing energy-intensive imports to avoid international distortions. In the end, imports would be taxed with respect to CO 2 to the same amount as home-made production. The revenues could be returned in full or in part to China temporarily for technology transfer. All options are difficult, require changes in policy and should be made, at least gradually, in line with changes in the global trading system which at present is not accorded to environmental requirements. However, business as usual is the worst of all options.
